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The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT; Sartori et al., 2008) is a variant of the
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) that is used to establish whether
an autobiographical memory is encoded in the respondent’s mind/brain. More specifically,
with the aIAT, it is possible to evaluate which one of two autobiographical events is true.
The method consists of a computerized categorization task. The aIAT includes stimuli
belonging to four categories, two of them are logical categories and are represented by
sentences that are always true (e.g., I am in front of a computer) or always false (e.g.,
I am climbing a mountain) for the respondent; two other categories are represented by
alternative versions of an autobiographical event (e.g., I went to Paris for Christmas, or
I went to New York for Christmas), only one of which is true. The true autobiographical
event is identified because, in a combined block, it gives rise to faster reaction times
when it shares the same motor response with true sentences. Here, we reviewed all the
validation experiments and found more than 90% accuracy in detecting the true memory.
We show that agreement in identifying the true autobiographicalmemory of the same aIAT
repeated twice is, on average, more than 90%, and we report a technique for estimating
accuracy associated with a single classification based on the D-IAT value, which may be
used in single subject’s investigations. We show that the aIAT might be used to identify
also true intentions and reasons and conclude with a series of guidelines for building an
effective aIAT.
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Autobiographical memory is the ability to remember events
that constitute part of one’s life, such as directly experienced
events. It is part of the episodic memory, which is, in turn,
part of the long-term memory (Tulving, 1983). Available assess-
ment methodologies of autobiographical memories focus on the
subject’s overall ability to recall past memorized events. For exam-
ple, the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman
et al., 1989) consists of a series of questions asking subjects to
retrieve personal events related to a target concept. Most tech-
niques for investigating this field are limited to the estimation of
the individual/patient’s capacity of recalling past autobiographi-
cal information rather than measuring the presence/absence of a
specific autobiographical memory.
Methods for evaluating single autobiographical memories are
limited to a few techniques such as the Guilty Knowledge Test
(GKT; Lykken, 1959; Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003) also known
as Concealed Information Test (CIT). The GKT largely relies
on the orienting response. In a typical GKT examination, par-
ticipants, while undergoing the polygraph testing (physiological
measurements), are shown a series of stimuli, including a salient
one, related to a crime. When the stimulus related to the crime
is shown, the subject can easily recognize it, thus producing an
orienting reflex (e.g., skin conductance increase and heart rate
deceleration). For a recent book on this technique, see Verschuere
et al. (2011).
A new method that can be used to identify a true auto-
biographical memory, intentions and reasons that motivate an
act is the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), a
variant of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al.,
1998). Here, we will review all the published experiments on
the aIAT so far. The traditional IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is
a method for assessing the strengths of automatic associations.
The method consists of a computerized task. Participants have
to classify stimuli as quickly as possible in four different cate-
gories: two target concept categories (e.g., European American
vs. African American names) and two attribute categories (pleas-
ant vs. unpleasant) using two keys, one on the right and one on
the left side of the keyboard. In one combined block, two cat-
egories (one from the target concept and one from the attribute
dimension) are mapped on the same response key (e.g., European
American names and pleasant words with the same key vs. African
American names and unpleasant words with the other key). In a
reversed combined block, participants have to classify the same
four categories reversely paired (e.g., African American names
and pleasant words with a key vs. European American names and
unpleasant words with the other key), so that both target con-
cept categories are paired with both attribute categories. The IAT
effect is expressed as the difference between the combined and
reversed combined blocks. In the block where two associated con-
cepts require the same motor response, reaction times (RTs) will
be faster than in the block where the same two concepts require
different motor responses. Thus, the typical finding in this exper-
iment is that, for European American participants, the stronger
associated concept-attribute pair is the one coupling European
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American names and pleasant words: This block should be easier
to categorize than the one associating African American names
and pleasant words. The reversed pattern is found for African
American participants. The IAT has been extensively studied in
social psychology to assess implicit beliefs, attitudes, and prej-
udices to measure self-esteem and self-concept (Nosek et al.,
2007).
Clinical applications indicate that the IAT may be an effective
technique to identify suicide-prone subjects, Pedophilia sexual
orientation, doping, and personality assessment (Gray et al., 2005;
Schmukle et al., 2008; Nock et al., 2010; Petròczi et al., 2010).
Nock et al. (2010), for example, reported that the IAT might be
useful in detecting suicidal ideations in people who attempted
suicide. The authors documented that a high implicit associa-
tion between self and death in suicide attempters is linked to a
6-fold risk increase in committing a suicide attempt in the next 6
months.
The aIAT (Sartori et al., 2008) is a variant of the IAT
(Greenwald et al., 1998) that could be used to establish whether
an autobiographical memory trace is encoded in the respondent’s
mind/brain. More specifically, with the aIAT, it is possible to
evaluate which one of two autobiographical events is true.
The aIAT differs, for example, from the above European
American/African American IAT as the evaluative dimension
(pleasant/unpleasant) is substituted by a logical dimension
(True/False), which is represented by sentences describing events
that are certainly true (e.g., I am sitting in front of a computer)
and certainly false (e.g., I am climbing amountain). Furthermore,
the target concept categories (e.g., European American/African
American) are represented by sentences describing alternative
versions of an autobiographical event (e.g., I went to Paris for
Christmas vs. I went to New York for Christmas), only one
of which is true. The true autobiographical event is identified
because, in a combined block, it gives rise to faster RTs when
it shares the same motor response with true sentences. If the
participant spent his/her vacation in Paris, the block associat-
ing true sentences and sentences related to Paris will be faster
than the block associating true sentences and sentences related to
New York.
The aIAT is structured in five blocks, three simple blocks
(1, 2, 4), and two combined categorization blocks (3 and 5). In
simple blocks, each response button is used to classify sentences
related to only one category. In double blocks each response but-
ton is used to classify sentences related to two different categories.
In Block 1, participants have to classify true and false sentences
(e.g., I am in front of a computer vs. I am in front of a television)
using two response keys, one on the left and one on the right
of the keyboard. In Block 2, participants have to classify auto-
biographical sentences (e.g., I went to Paris for Christmas vs. I
went to New York for Christmas) with the same two response
keys. In Block 3 (double categorization block), true sentences
and sentences related to the first autobiographical event (e.g.,
Christmas in Paris) are paired on the same response key and false
sentences and sentences related to the second autobiographical
event (e.g., Christmas in New York) are classified with the
other response key. In Block 4, only autobiographical events
are reversely classified with the two response keys. Finally, in
Block 5, participants have to classify both true sentences and sen-
tences related to the second autobiographical event (Christmas
in New York) with the same response key, and false sentences
and the first autobiographical event (Christmas in Paris) with the
other key.
The aIAT/IAT effect is expressed in terms of average RT differ-
ence between the two double categorization blocks: the congruent
block (pairing the two associated categories) and the incongruent
block (pairing the non-associated categories).
Used as a memory detection technique, the aIAT has a
number of advantages related to the use of reaction times
(Seymour et al., 2000), when compared to traditional psy-
chophysiological techniques of lie detection (e.g., Ben-Shakhar
and Elaad, 2003) or fMRI-based lie detection strategies (e.g.,
Langleben et al., 2005). For instance, it can be admin-
istered quickly (10–15min), it is based on an unmanned
analysis (no training for the user is necessary), it requires
low-tech equipment (a standard PC is sufficient), and it can
be administered remotely to many participants (e.g., via the
internet).
DETECTION OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES: A REVIEW
OF VALIDATION STUDIES
The aIAT accuracy in identifying the true memory has been
investigated in a series of validation experiments summarized in
Table 1. In this table, we separated first from second adminis-
tration of an aIAT. Here, in order to evaluate the accuracy of
the method, we included only experiments that did not include
negative statements as subsequent investigations (Agosta et al.,
2011c), conducted after the original publication (Sartori et al.,
2008), indicated that the use of negative sentences or reminder
labels generates unreliable and inaccurate results. For this reason,
the following experiments were excluded:
1. Mock crime experiment (experiment 2) in Sartori et al. (2008).
2. Cocaine/heroine experiment (experiment 3) in Sartori et al.
(2008).
3. Driving license experiment (experiment 5) in Sartori et al.
(2008).
4. Control conditions (innocent or guilty) of experiments 1 to 3
reported by Verschuere et al. (2009).
5. Experiments 1 to 4 in Agosta et al. (2011c) used to verify the
accuracy of the aIAT using negative statements.
Moreover, data used to calculate the accuracy refer to adminis-
trations of the aIAT prior to or without manipulations (faking,
training, EEG-required-modifications of stimulus presentation)
and for this reason we decided to exclude:
1. Naive faking and experienced faking groups in experiments
1–4 described in Agosta et al. (2011b).
2. Faking conditions of experiments 1–3 in Verschuere et al.
(2009).
3. Intention aIAT combined with EEG (experiment 3 in Agosta
et al., 2011a).
4. Second administration of the practice, instruction and train-
ing groups in Hu et al. (2012).
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Table 1 | In this table, the results from all the validation experiments are summarized.
Experiment Source Number of
subjects
Participants
classified correctly
using the D-IAT
Average IAT
effect
Average D-IAT Confidence
interval 95%
FIRST ADMINISTRATION
Card aIAT Sartori et al., 2008 37 35/37
AUC = 0.99
316ms 0.56 0.45–0.67
Holiday aIAT Sartori et al., 2008 20 18/20 219ms 0.44 0.25–0.63
Christmas holiday
aIAT (non-faking
group)
Agosta et al., 2011b 14 14/14 955ms 1.06 0.84–1.28
Mock crime aIAT
(affirmative
sentences; first
aIAT administered)
Agosta et al., 2011c 40 35/40 297ms 0.56 0.41–0.71
Intention aIAT
(Experiment 1)
Agosta et al., 2011a 22 22/22 712ms 1.16 1.00–1.33
True memory aIAT
(first aIAT
administered)
Marini et al., 2012 18 18/18 879ms 1.02 0.89–1.15
Flashbulb aIAT
Experiment
1 = outlier
Lanciano et al., 2012 42
14
Experiment 2 42/42
Experiment 1 14/14
Experiment
2 876ms
Experiment
1 1082ms
Experiment 2
1.48
Experiment 1
3.87
Experiment 2
1.86–1.10
Experiment 1
2.8–4.93
White lies aIAT
(first aIAT
administered)
Agosta et al., 2013 20 20/20 444 s 0.55 0.42–0.68
Reasons aIAT*
(first aIAT
administered)
Agosta et al., 2013 20 20/20 309ms 0.46 0.37–0.55
Mock crime aIAT Hu and Rosenfeld, 2012 12+ 12+
12 = 36
Immediate guilty:
10/12
Innocents: 9/12
Delayed guilty: 7/12
Immediate
guilty: 92ms
Innocents:
69ms
Delayed
guilty: 82ms
Immediate
guilty: 0.23
Innocents: 0.32
Delayed guilty:
0.32
Immediate
guilty:
−0.08–0.54
Innocents:
0.13–0.51
Delayed guilty:
0.14–0.50
Mock crime
Pretest repetition
group
Hu et al., 2012 16 16/16
AUC = 0.98
121ms 0.52 0.39–0.65
Mock crime
Pretest practice
group
Hu et al., 2012 16 13/16
AUC = 0.91
114ms 0.46 0.29–0.63
Mock crime
Pretest instruction
group
Hu et al., 2012 16 13/16
AUC = 0.95
103ms 0.47 0.28–0.66
Mock crime
Pretest training
group
Hu et al., 2012 16 15/16
AUC = 0.98
94ms 0.51 0.35–0.67
Action aIAT
(Imagined + not
imagined)
Takarangi et al., 2013 79 77/79 Not reported 0.585 0.53–0.64
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Experiment Source Number of
subjects
Participants
classified correctly
using the D-IAT
Average
IAT effect
Average D-IAT Confidence
interval 95%
Average 17 aIATs 412 92% accuracy 0.58 0.41–0.73
SECOND ADMINISTRATION
Christmas holiday aIAT
(non-faking group with
previous aIAT experience not
reported in the paper as was
only considered a practice)
Agosta et al., 2011b 20 19/20 445ms 0.64 0.48–0.80
Two cards aIAT (non faking
group with previous aIAT
experience not reported in
the paper as was only
considered a practice)
Agosta et al., 2011b 12 11/12 236ms 0.45 0.26–0.64
Ten cards aIAT (non-faking
group with previous aIAT
experience not reported in
the paper as was only
considered a practice)
Agosta et al., 2011b 20 20/20 684ms 1.13 1.03–1.22
Mock crime aIAT (affirmative
sentences; second aIAT
administered)
Agosta et al., 2011c 40 35/40 220ms 0.45 0.33–0.57
True memory aIAT Marini et al., 2012 18 18/18 606ms 0.87 0.80–1.08
White lies aIAT
(second aIAT administered)
Agosta et al., 2013 20 20/20 280ms 0.45 0.34–0.56
Reasons aIAT
(second aIAT administered)
Agosta et al., 2013 20 19/20 266ms 0.50 0.39–0.61
Mock crime
(Repetition group; second
aIAT administered)
Hu et al., 2012 16 15/16 92ms 0.41 0.28–0.54
Average 8 aIATs 166 94% accuracy 0.67 0.48–0.87
For each experiment, the number of participants together with average D-IAT values are reported. First administrations have been separated from second adminis-
trations of an aIAT.
*White lies and Reasons aIATs have been administered to the same participants, but have been included in this analysis not fulfilling the criteria for a systematic
review. When excluding the Reason aIAT (second IAT administered to the same subjects), weighted average D-IAT is 0.59 for the first administration and 0.70 for
the second administration. As shown, when eliminating the same subjects from analysis there are no substantial changes in the effect size.For each experiment,
the number of participants together with average D-IAT values are reported. First administrations have been separated from second administrations of an aIAT.
Repetitions of aIAT administrations to participants were only
included in the analysis if there were no manipulations in
between. Thus, in Table 1, we only report data from partici-
pants who either completed only one aIAT or two aIATs without
manipulations in between.
In all the experiments, the validity of the aIAT was tested
against a known false event. For example, in the card experiment,
a card, which was actually chosen by the participant, was com-
pared to the non-selected card. In the autobiographical memory
experiment, a real autobiographical event, as assessed through a
preliminary questionnaire, was compared to a false event. For this
reason, we excluded:
1. Experiment 2 in Agosta et al. (2011a) because evaluating the
difference between intentions and hopes and not presenting
two contrasting events or intentions (i.e., hopes are true as well
as intentions).
2. False memory aIAT in Marini et al. (2012) because comparing
two actual false events (one believed to be true).
Two measures can be used for evaluating the diagnostic accu-
racy: the magnitude of the IAT effect (RTs of the incongruent
block minus the RTs of the congruent block) and the D-IAT value
(D600; Greenwald et al., 2003). Here, we focused in particular
on the D-IAT value. This index combines speed of response and
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classification accuracy. It includes a penalty for errors and vari-
ability. It expresses the difference in the mean latencies of the
double categorization blocks scaled by the standard deviation of
response latencies. It is calculated by subtracting corrected mean
RTs of the congruent block from corrected mean RTs of the incon-
gruent block and dividing this difference by the inclusive standard
deviation for the two blocks.
Effect size was the average D-IAT value. To calculate an average
effect size across all the studies, the D-IAT values were weighted by
the inverse variance in order to deal with the different and small
sample sizes of each study (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). The only
outlier (Flashbulb aIAT, Experiment 1; Lanciano et al., 2012) was
identified using the interquartile range and was not included in
the calculation of the mean effect size.
For the first-administration studies (17), homogeneity among
study results was evaluated using Cochran’s Q combined with
the I2 statistic. Cochran’s Q value had to be compared to a chi-
square distribution with k-1 (number of studies -1) degrees of
freedom. In our case, it resulted in a value of 9.26, below the criti-
cal value for 16 degrees of freedom in a chi-square distribution
(26.3). This value indicated low heterogeneity. The interpreta-
tion of the I2 statistic was made following Higgins and colleagues’
directions (Higgins et al., 2003) with values of 25% representing
low heterogeneity, 50% moderate heterogeneity, and 75% high
heterogeneity. Our I2 is equal to 0%. D-IAT values were com-
bined to obtain a mean effect-size using a fixed-effect approach
because of the low heterogeneity. D-IAT average value resulted in
0.57 (95% C.I. 0.41–0.73).
For a total of 8 s administration studies, Cochran’s Q was
8.51 (<14.1–7 degrees of freedom) and the I2 was 0%. Again, we
used a fixed-effect model for calculating the mean effect size of
0.67 (95% C.I. 0.48–0.87).
Weighted average D-IAT for the first administration was 0.57,
while for the second-administration studies it was 0.67. More
studies are needed in order to investigate the effect of repetition of
an aIAT. Indeed, in the studies reported here, the same aIAT has
never been repeated twice.
To determine the accuracy of the test, we used the direction of
the D-IAT values, calculated by subtracting the congruent block
from the incongruent one, with negative values indicating an
incorrect classification (i.e., the identification of the false mem-
ory as true) and positive D-IAT values indicating the correct
identification of the true memory.
Accuracy was also calculated across a total of 412 first admin-
istrations of the aIAT to participants (Q = 4.7 < 26.3; I2 = 0%).
The weighted average classification accuracy was 92% (95% C.I.
83–100%). Across a total of 166 s administrations (Q = 0.41 <
14.1; I2 = 0%), the weighted average accuracy was 94% (95%C.I.
80–100%). Clearly, repetition of the aIAT does not decrease the
overall accuracy.
In this small review, we mainly included experiments from the
same laboratory. Importantly, in Table 1, we have also included
data of five mock-crime experiments from two other laborato-
ries (Hu and Rosenfeld, 2012; Hu et al., 2012; Takarangi et al.,
2013). These data include preliminary aIATs administered to
four groups of participants that were subsequently tested with
a variety of manipulations between test and retest, and data on
performed and non-performed actions. Finally, we added data
from an associated laboratory (Lanciano et al., 2012).
Recently, a modified version of the IAT/aIAT has been
used in order to distinguish between seen and unseen events
(eyewitness—Implicit Association Test—eIAT; Freng and Kehn,
2012). The authors tested a total of 18 participants and showed
that the eIAT “successfully distinguished between witnessed and
non-witnessed details” of a video. In particular, they reported that
central and peripheral details of a scene were efficiently identi-
fied (central details; D = 0.5, peripheral details D = 0.42). These
data have not been included in Table 1 because of a lack of details
in the text (i.e., average reaction times of congruent and incon-
gruent blocks, accuracy of the D-IAT values in identifying the
eye-witnessed event). Results of this experiment show that the
aIAT cannot only be used to identify episodic memory of an own
action, but also an observed event.
OVERALL ACCURACY AND ACCURACY AS A FUNCTION OF
D-IAT
The D-IAT value measures the strength of the IAT effect com-
bining both RTs and errors. The D-IAT value used as clas-
sification criterion yields correct classifications in more than
90% of the cases, with a weighted average value of 0.58 for
first-administration studies and 0.67 for second-administration
studies.
When analysing the relation between classification accuracy
and D-IAT values, we found that it varies depending on D-IAT
values. For D-IAT values just above zero, classification accuracy
is just above 50%, while for D-IAT values larger than 0.6, the
classification is almost 100% (please refer to Figure 1).
Figure 1 was drawn as follows:
1. Data were used from eight previous validation experiments
[first-administration aIAT only and limited to experiments
conducted in our research group: Card aIAT in Sartori et al.
(2008); Holiday aIAT in Sartori et al. (2008); Christmas holi-
day aIAT in Agosta et al. (2011b); Mock crime aIAT in Agosta
FIGURE 1 | Classification accuracy as a function of the D-IAT value.
Data from eight validation experiments, for a total of 209 subjects, were
used to calculate accuracy in identifying the true autobiographical memory
on the basis of the D-IAT value. D-IAT values have been grouped in bins of
0,1. In the Y axis, the number of participants for each bin is reported.
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et al. (2011c); Intention aIAT in Agosta et al. (2011a); True and
false memory aIAT in Marini et al. (2012); White lies aIAT in
Agosta et al. (2013); Reasons aIAT in Agosta et al. (2013)] for
a total of 209 subjects.
2. For each participant, the D-IAT value was used with infor-
mation about whether the classification of the target true
autobiographical memory was correct (1) or wrong (0).
3. Subjects were ordered for increasing values of absolute D-IAT
value.
4. D-IAT values were grouped in bins of 0.1.
5. For each D-IAT value group, the corresponding accuracy was
calculated (different number of participants for each D-IAT
value group).
6. Each black dot on the figure represents the corresponding
accuracy of a specific D-IAT value group.
This D/accuracy figure highlights the close relationship between
accuracy and D-IAT value. First, it is important to note that
only for a few D-IAT values is the accuracy lower than 0.8 (80%
correct classifications), and most of the values with the lower
accuracy are included in the window between 0 and 0.2. For
this reason, we would advise considering any D-IAT value from
0 to 0.2 as inconclusive. Across the total of 209 subjects, 10%
showed an inconclusive result. Moreover, the figure highlights
the fact that D-IAT values greater than 0.6 are always classi-
fied correctly and, more importantly that the majority of the
D-IAT values have 100% accuracy. This D/accuracy function
could help in estimating the probability of correct classifica-
tion depending on the individual test result, thus increasing
the confidence of the technique when making inferences on a
single test.
An important issue in clinical and forensic single-case investi-
gations is the estimation of the validity of the test results. In short,
if a subject’s D is equal to 0.43 from Figure 1, we would expect
that his/her result is in the 0.4–0.49 range and has an average
accuracy of 81%.
RELIABILITY OF aIAT
SPLIT-HALF RELIABILITY
Ideally, a good memory detection technique should identify the
same true memory from different subsets of items. This feature is
assessed with the split-half technique.
aIAT split-half reliability has been computed after separating
odd and even stimuli and then deriving, for each test, two D-IAT
values. Data were calculated over a subgroup of the previous val-
idation experiments: the first-administration studies. The main
result indicates an average 88% of agreement in the identification
of the true autobiographical memory (correct or incorrect classi-
fication of the subject on the basis of the D-IAT value), of even
and odd stimuli (please refer to Table 2).
Correlations of the D-IAT values, calculated separately for
odd and for even trials, resulted in an average split-half value
of r = 0.52, with a low correlation between even and odd stim-
uli in the “Intention aIAT.” There are no apparent reasons for
this low correlation, but the agreement in identifying the true
autobiographical memory is 90%. Thus, even if the correlation
of the D-IAT values is low, both values, derived from the even
Table 2 | Split-half correlation, percentage agreement between
classifications derived on even numbers and classification derived
from odd numbers in five experiments.
Experiment Agreement % Split-half
correlation
Card aIAT (Sartori et al., 2008) 73 r = 0.47 p < 0.003
Mock Crime (Agosta et al.,
2011c)
85 r = 0.48 p < 0.002
Christmas holiday aIAT
(non-faking group, Agosta
et al., 2011b)
100 r = 0.67 p < 0.006
Intentions (Experiment 1,
Agosta et al., 2011a)
90 r = 0.17 p = 0.465
White lie aIAT (Agosta et al.,
2013)
90 r = 0.83 p < 0.001
and odd stimuli, result in a comparable identification of the true
autobiographical memory.
ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF THE CONGRUENT BLOCK
In order to establish if there is an agreement between the results
obtained with different orders of the congruent and incongruent
blocks (3rd and 5th positions), we also analysed the correlation of
D-IAT values of the same aIAT with the congruent block either
in the 3rd (direct order) or the 5th position (reversed order),
and consequently, the incongruent block in the 5th or the 3rd
position. Two experiments (Table 3) in which participants were
administered both orders (direct and reversed), taken from the
previous validation table, were used for this analysis: the “Mock
crime” aIAT reported in Agosta et al. (2011c) and the “White lie”
aIAT (Agosta et al., 2013). All the participants in the two experi-
ments were administered two aIATs: one in the direct and one in
the reversed order. In the “Mock crime” aIATs, the order of pre-
sentation of the two aIATs was counterbalanced across subjects,
while in the “White lies” aIAT (Agosta et al., 2013) the first aIAT
always had the congruent block in the third position.
Results indicated that the agreement in the identification of
the true autobiographical memory for the direct and reversed
orders (on the basis of the direction of the D values) was high:
95% and 85% for the “White lie” and “Mock crime” experiments,
respectively.
Moreover, the correlation of D-IAT values (for the direct and
reversed orders) was 0.15 for the “White lie” and 0.63 for the
“Mock crime” experiment. For the White lie experiment, as for
the Intention experiment presented in the previous section, we do
not have an explanation for this low correlation, but the level of
agreement is high and there is no reduction in the identification
of the true memory.
FACTORS REDUCING ACCURACY ANDMODULATING THE
aIAT
Further research was conducted in order to highlight the limita-
tions in the use of aIAT. Specifically, the effect of faking, of using
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negative sentences and negative labels, has been investigated. The
results are summarized below.
EFFECTS OF FAKING ON MEMORY DETECTION
Verschuere et al. (2009) have shown that properly trained partic-
ipants may alter the test outcome strategically. Participants may
be trained to alter the test outcome by speeding up the incon-
gruent blocks and slowing down the congruent block. Verschuere
et al. (2009) instructed the guilty participants in a mock-crime
task to appear as “innocents” by slowing down their responses.
Their results indicated that a big percentage of the guilty partic-
ipants not previously exposed to the aIAT succeeded in faking
the test, but only when explicitly taught the strategy to coun-
terfeit the test outcome. These results were further refined by
Agosta et al. (2011b) who showed that: (i) instructed fakers
(explicitly instructed by the experimenter to succeed in alter-
ing the test outcome) may alter the test outcome by making a
false memory appear true and vice versa and (ii) fakers may
be distinguished from non-fakers on the basis of an algorithm
that compares response speed in simple blocks with response
speed in double blocks. Their results are summarized in the
Table 4.
In short, a non-trained subject instructed to fake, but using
self-discovered strategies, does not often succeed in his/her
attempt. By contrast, when previously trained on the best strat-
egy to fake (e.g., speed up incongruent block and slow down
the congruent block), examinees can alter their results and
beat the “memory detector.” However, these successful fakers
may be detected on the basis of their response pattern through
a faking-detection algorithm. This algorithm is based on a
comparison of the average speed in double and single blocks.
Indeed, participants leave a signature when trying to fake the
test: They do not alter their RTs in single blocks and are abnor-
mally slow in double categorizations blocks (Agosta et al., 2011b).
This feature has been used with high accuracy (83%) to detect
fakers. The more efficient algorithm for detecting fakers con-
sists of three steps: (i) remove all responses below 150 and above
10,000ms, (ii) replace errors with the average RT of the block
with a penalty of 600ms, and (iii) calculate the ratio between the
average RT of the fastest block (between 3 or 5) and single tasks
that are directly connected to the fastest task in terms of motor
response (1 and 2 or 1 and 4, respectively). If the result exceeds
1.08, then the respondent is faking. This cut-off was identified
as the one yielding the maximal classification accuracy in our
sample.
Hu et al. (2012) investigated this same issue. The authors con-
firmed that specific instructions given to the subjects might be
effective in altering the aIAT results. Furthermore, they showed
that this pattern of results might be further enhanced with a spe-
cific training in the incongruent trial. Thus, they reported that
instructions and training together are more effective than instruc-
tions alone in reversing the results compared with a pre-test.
In their experiment, they reported failing to find a significant
difference between fakers and non-fakers using the previously
described indexes. Those results highlight the need for an in-
depth investigation of this important issue. Only two studies have
been published so far on the possibility of identifying fakers with
non-consistent results.
Table 3 | Correlation and agreement of D-IAT values and IAT effect for normal (congruent block in 3rd position and incongruent block in 5th
position) and inverted (congruent block in 5th position and incongruent block in the 3rd position) orders.
Experiment 3–5 Agreement D-IAT Correlation
IAT effect
Correlation
D-IAT
Mock crime (Agosta et al., 2011b) Order counterbalanced across
participants
85% r = 0.25
p < 0.11
r = 0.63
p < 0.001
White lies (Agosta et al., 2013) Order fixed with the first aIAT
administered having the congruent as
block 3 and the second aIAT
administered having the congruent
block as block 5
95% r = 0.25
p < 0.28
r = 0.15
p < 0.53
Table 4 | Data from four experiments comparing control non-fakers, naïve fakers, and instructed fakers are reported (Agosta et al., 2011b).
Experiment Non-fakers Non-fakers correct Naïve fakers Naïve fakers correct Instructed fakers Instructed fakers correct
D-IAT classifications D-IAT classifications D-IAT classifications
1 1.06 14/14 0.78 14/14 −0.45 5/14
2 0.64 19/20 0.24 6/10 −0.42 7/20
3 1.13 20/20 0.82 18/18 −0.81 4/34
4 0.45 11/12 0.15 6/12 0.06 7/12
Control non-fakers were administered the test without specific instructions, and naïve fakers were instructed to alter the results but were not taught the more
efficient strategy. Instructed fakers were instructed to alter the results by speeding up in the incongruent trial and slowing down in the incongruent trial.
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EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE SENTENCES AS DESCRIPTORS OF
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL EVENTS ON aIAT ACCURACY
False memories may be described by using a negative description
of the true memory. Agosta et al. (2011c) have shown that, when
affirmative sentences and reminder labels are used to describe the
true and false autobiographical events, accuracy is very high at
up to 90% (Agosta et al., 2011c). By contrast, in four studies,
the authors (Agosta et al., 2011c) showed that when negative sen-
tences and labels are used, there is a reduction of about the 30%,
in the accuracy of the aIAT in identifying the true autobiographi-
cal event. The accuracy of the aIAT is reduced not only by negative
sentences, but also by affirmative sentences describing counter-
events. The affirmative counter-event sentences were stated with
expressions such as different place from instead of the negative
(e.g., “I have been to Rome,” vs. “I have been to a different place
than Rome”). Negative and affirmative counter-event sentences
can be considered as equivalent from this point of view. Counter-
event sentences show a more difficult grammatical structure than
simple negative sentences and, at the same time, have a nega-
tive inner meaning (e.g., having been in a different place than
Rome means not having been in Rome). Those might be plausi-
ble reasons for the aIAT’s low accuracy when using counter-event
sentences. The use of negatives renders the test highly inaccurate
and should therefore be avoided.
aIAT APPLICATION TO FLASHBULB AND FALSE MEMORIES
FLASHBULB MEMORIES
For many years, researchers have debated whether flashbulb
memories (FBMs) can be considered either as a special class of
accurate emotional memories that are exceptionally vivid and
resistant to decay (Pillemer, 1984; Bohannon, 1988; Conway
et al., 1994) or as memories affected by reconstructive factors
such as ordinary autobiographical memories. The controversial
debate concerning the real existence of this special class of mem-
ories reflects the difficulty in establishing the accuracy of these
autobiographical formations.
FBMs are usually recalled with a higher degree of confidence
than other autobiographical memories (Brown and Kulik, 1977;
Weaver, 1993; Talarico and Rubin, 2003, 2007, 2009). It is inter-
esting to note that the participants’ confidence does not decrease
even when it is clear that the recalled event had not occurred in
the same way as it is remembered (Neisser and Harsch, 1992).
Indeed, according to some authors, what makes FBMs so unique
and special is the individual’s sense of confidence in his/her accu-
racy, which is preserved for a long time after the occurrence of the
original eliciting event (Weaver, 1993; Talarico and Rubin, 2003,
2007, 2009).
Lanciano et al. (2012) have investigated the specific character-
istic of FBM by asking 14 participants to fill out a questionnaire
concerning the death of Pope Johannes Paulus II. On average,
subjects were tested 2235 days after the pope’s death. The ques-
tionnaire investigated seven FBM attributes: (1) date when the
individuals learned of the pope’s death, (2) day, (3) time of the
day, (4) informant (family, friends, colleagues, media), (5) loca-
tion (country, city, room, or other kind of location, i.e., the car),
(6) presence of other people, and (7) ongoing activity. An aIAT
contrasting the true memory with a fabricated false memory was
administered to participants 1 week later. All 14 participants were
correctly classified using the D-IAT values. Average D was 3.85,
which is a very high value compared to other typical values as
reported in Table 1. Consistency among repeated measures of
FBM is a typical parameter describing the quality of this sort of
memory. The authors reported a high correlation of 0.85 between
consistency value and D-IAT values at the aIAT. In short, themore
consistent the FBM is among repetitions, the higher the D-IAT
value is observed.
FALSE MEMORIES
It is known that human memory is prone to various kinds of
distortions and illusions (Roediger, 1996; Schacter, 1999; Loftus,
2003). It has been shown that, in contrast to deception, memory
illusions are often not accompanied by a subjective feeling that
people are responding untruthfully. Quite the contrary, memory
illusions like those produced in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott
paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995)
are accompanied by a sense of recollection that, at the conscious
phenomenological level, makes them indistinguishable from true
memories. DRM false memories are obtained by presenting lists
of words related to a non-presented critical lure. The probabil-
ity of recalling and recognizing the critical lure is usually quite
high (Roediger and McDermott, 1995; Balota et al., 1999; Stadler
et al., 1999; Budson et al., 2002). Previous findings have shown
that critical lures seem to elicit the same quality (i.e., remember
judgments) of presented items (e.g., Roediger and McDermott,
1995), and participants are even able to state in which voice they
heard the non-presented critical lure when half of the list items
had been presented by a female voice and half by a male voice
(Payne et al., 1996).
In this study, Marini et al. (2012) used a standard DRM task to
induce false memories, followed by the two aIATs. By comparing
the results of the two aIATs, one could observe whether partici-
pants were responding differently to true and false DRM mem-
ories. One aIAT compared presented items with non-presented
distracters (aIAT true memories), whereas the second aIAT (aIAT
false memories) compared critical lures with non-presented dis-
tracters. Specifically, the aIAT truememories evaluated the associ-
ation of the presented items with the true logical dimension, while
the aIAT false memories evaluated the association of the critical
lures with the true logical dimension. Therefore, if true memories
(presented items in the aIAT true memories) and false memories
(critical lures in the aIAT false memories) were encoded differ-
ently, as suggested by neuroimaging studies (Cabeza et al., 2001;
Slotnick and Schacter, 2004), they would have a different strength
in their association with the true logical dimension. If, however,
the aIAT is based on the individual’s “aware” belief that the crit-
ical lure is indeed present, then the aIAT would be ineffective
in detecting any difference between presented items and critical
lures. Results indicated that false memories are strongly associ-
ated with true sentences (36/36 participants), giving rise to similar
associations as true memories with true sentences.
This result indicates that the aIAT reflects exactly what is stored
in our memory, and if a memory is strongly believed to be true,
then the aIAT would identify it as a true memory. An interesting
issue that stems from the false-memory work concerns its applied
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implications: Does the aIAT always identify a true memory when
this is strongly believed to be true? Does the self-persuasion of a
false memory as true influence the result of the aIAT? All these
issues have to be investigated in more detail in future studies.
It has been shown that false memories may stem from “source
confusion” (Takarangi et al., 2013), which is defined as “the attri-
bution of a specific memory to a particular source using heuristics
that may lead to errors.” Takarangi et al. (2013) reported an exper-
iment aimed at verifying the aIAT diagnostic abilities in detecting
whether an action was performed or not. After asking their partic-
ipants to perform or not to perform an action, the authors further
required them to imagine both performed and non-performed
actions.
They reported an overall aIAT accuracy of 97.5% in detect-
ing whether the action was performed or not, confirming the
efficiency of aIAT in identifying memories of performed actions
when contrasted to memories of non-performed actions.
Importantly, the experimental design allowed the computa-
tion of a source discrimination score derived by subtracting
ratings for non-performed actions from ratings of performed
actions (the authors asked the participants to rate how much
they believed that they had performed the action, and then
rated how much they remembered performing the action). They
found that imagining an action increased the subjective trend
of believing and remembering actions as performed rather than
non-performed actions. They also found that the D-IAT value
diminishes with the source discrimination score. In short, the
more the memories are subjectively confused (acted vs. not acted)
by the subject, the lower the D-IAT. The authors claim that
this is a limitation of the aIAT when it is required to iden-
tify false memories. However, a close inspection of Figure 2
in their paper shows that only two of 79 subjects were mis-
classified and this indicates that, even if D-IAT is affected
by source confusion, this did not increase misclassification in
their study.
DETECTION OF INTENTIONS
Deliberation of a future action is called prior intention in one
terminology (Searle, 1983). Prior intentions include goal-related
processing and deliberative conscious intentions that are intu-
itively believed to be the leading cause of our future behaviors
(Bratman, 1987; Cohen and Levesque, 1990). In other words,
these are mental representations that occur prior to the action
itself and are typically believed to cause the action subjectively.
Searle (1983) refers to prior intentions as the initial representa-
tion of the goal of an action prior to the initiation of the action:
a type of intention that is formed in advance of a deliberate plan
for a future action. In contrast, an intention in action (also termed
motor intention) is the proximal cause of the physiological chain
leading to an overt behavior.
Other scholars have addressed a possible distinction between
long-term antecedents of action (prior intentions; Searle, 1983)
and short-term antecedents of actions (intentions in action;
Searle, 1983; Becchio et al., 2008, 2010). Long-term antecedents
have also been named “prospective intentions” (Pacherie and
Haggard, 2010), “distal intentions” (Pacherie, 2008), or “future-
directed” intentions (Bratman, 1987).
An experiment showing that intentions to act may be identi-
fied reliably with the aIAT will be summarized here (please refer
to Table 5). Agosta et al. (2011a) have investigated whether real
intentions could be distinguished from false intentions using the
aIAT, finding that both short-term intentions (where to sleep the
upcoming night) and long-term intentions (professional career)
could be distinguished from plausible, but false intentions.
They further showed that the basis of such discrimination was
related to intentions per se rather than hopes. In fact, when con-
trasted with hope sentences, intentions with or without pleasant
outcomes were strongly associated with true sentences (Agosta
et al., 2011a; Experiment 2).
DETECTION OF REASONS UNDERLYING LIES
According to De Paulo et al. (1996) and Vrij (2007), the reasons
to lie may differ in terms of (1) the person who benefits from
the lie (whether self or other-oriented), (2) the consequences
of lying (in order to gain advantage or to avoid costs), and (3)
the type of lying (whether for materialistic or psychological rea-
sons). Self and other oriented lies are told either to protect oneself
or others psychologically (e.g., protect from embarrassment or
loss of face). According to Feldman (2009), standards of tact and
politeness and expectations can make deception, to some degree,
almost inevitable. Agosta et al. (2013) showed that the aIAT
might be used to distinguish true from false reasons underlying
other oriented lies (white lies) and that 20/20 (direct order) and
19/20 (reversed order) participants were correctly classified, with
a D-IAT average value of 0.46 (direct order) and 0.50 (reversed
order), respectively.
CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed the validation experiments conducted so far
that use the autobiographical IAT. The aIAT is a variant of the
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) that might be used to establish the
association of an event with the true/false logical dimension. In
other words, the aIAT reveals which one of two contrasting events
is more associated with the truth.
Table 5 | The data for the intention experiment.
Experiment Participants RT congruent (ms) RT incongruent (ms) D % correct classification
Short term—sleep N = 11 1011 1975 1.30 11/11
Long term—job N = 11 1047 1507 1.02 11/11
The first condition refers to a short-term intention, where to sleep the coming night, while the second condition refers to a long-term intention of future work.
Classification reaches 100% accuracy for both conditions.
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Validation experiments have highlighted high classification
accuracy over a series of tests with average accuracy over 90%. The
average effect sizes were moderate: 0.57 for first-administration
experiments and 0.67 for second-administration experiments.
The previous results refer to a wide range of type of memories
for a total of 578 subjects. Results from Experiment 1 in Lanciano
et al. (2012) were excluded because the D-IAT was abnormally
high, presumably due to the outstanding features of flashbulb
memories.
It is worth noting that the same research group has carried
out most of the studies conducted so far. Only a few experiments
were conducted outside our laboratory (e.g., Hu and Rosenfeld,
2012; Hu et al., 2012; Takarangi et al., 2013) or in one associated
laboratory (Lanciano et al., 2012). More studies from other labo-
ratories are needed in order to better validate the technique and to
determine a more reliable effect size, as some of the independent
replications revealed lower effect sizes (Hu and Rosenfeld, 2012;
Hu et al., 2012).
The validity of other lie detection techniques such as the CIT
has usually been calculated using Cohen’s d. For example, the
meta-analysis by Ben-Shakhar and Elaad (2003) reported an over-
all average effect size of d = 1.55. Comparison of aIAT and CIT
effect sizes test might be difficult, given substantial differences in
calculating Cohen’s d (calculated as the difference between the
means of the detection score distributions of the guilty and inno-
cent samples; Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003) and the D-IAT values
(calculated as the difference between the incongruent and con-
gruent blocks of the same aIAT). The D-IAT algorithm takes into
account the phenomenon of speed-accuracy trade-off, which is
not an issue in CIT experiments.
In the future, the validation pipeline should include test-retest
reliability over longer time frames and all other issues addressed
in the CIT/GKT literature such as the modulating effects of per-
sonality and the full investigation of countermeasures. The CIT
is the major memory-detection technique and has a much longer
history and has been tested on a wider variety of conditions. The
aIAT validation studies, compared with the CIT validation stud-
ies, lack extensive field studies. As is frequently reported, in the
lie detection literature, studies carried out in the laboratory tend
to overestimate accuracy and for this reason it will be critical for
the aIAT to collect data in more ecological high-stake conditions
(Elaad, 2011).
We have also identified a series of conditions that reduce the
validity of the test and therefore should be avoided. Such con-
ditions include the use of negative sentences in describing the
events as well as using negative reminder labels. We have derived
a D/accuracy function that permits us to estimate at the single
subject level the probability of a given result in terms of accuracy,
showing that classification accuracy for D-IAT values in the range
of 0–0.2 is very poor, while D-IAT values above 0.6 are high and
values between 0.2 and 0.6 are above 80%. In practical uses of
the aIAT, attention should be paid to the level of D-IAT size as an
indirect index of result reliability.
Here we summaries the guidelines for building an effective
aIAT on the basis of the validation experiments reported above:
• Sentences related to true and false categories should always be
true and false for the respondent (examples of true sentences
are “I am in front of a computer,” or “I am sitting on a chair”;
examples of false sentences are “I am climbing a mountain,” or
“I am skiing”).
• Only one of the two events used to build an aIAT should be true
and the other should be false. Two contrasting events should
always be used; for example, “I left the door open” and “I closed
the door” are good examples of sentences, as only one of the
two is true for the respondent. The aIAT is supposed to uncover
which one of the two is true.
• Do not use negative reminder labels or sentences. Use two
contrasting autobiographical events.
• Before proceeding to the interpretation of the results, check
whether the examinee has faked the test or not. The only
available index up to now has been published in Agosta et al.
(2011b). It compares response speed in single blocks (blocks 1,
2, 4) with response speed in double blocks (blocks 3 and 5).
• Evaluate which of the two autobiographical sentences
is associated with true sentences using the D-IAT value.
Compare blocks 3 and block 5. Identify the fastest
block. The target autobiographical memory as the one
that is more associated with the true logical dimen-
sion (on the basis of the faster reaction times in blocks
3 or 5).
• In single case studies, the use of a window of uncertainty is
recommended. We suggest 0–0.2 as the uncertainty window. In
such a range, probabilities of correct classification range from
50 to 75%. Reliability, asmeasured by agreement, is good for D-
IAT values between 0.2 and 0.6 and very good for D-IAT values
above 0.6.
Here, we add suggestions for aIAT users resulting from our own
experience and highlighting the need for new studies that deeply
investigate these issues:
• Memories should be encoded in sentences limited to a single
line and about half a screen.
• Sentences describing autobiographical events should give a
clear-cut description of the event. Fuzzy descriptions should
be avoided, as valid discriminations have not been proven for
such types of descriptions.
• Only two single, specific events (one true and one false) should
be investigated; no more than two events, even if grouped in
the same categories, should be used.
• In single case studies, confidence in the final results could be
enhanced by using a design that includes: (i) build an aIAT
on known autobiographical data (e.g., date of birth, names
of sons, etc.) and check that this personal information is cor-
rectly identified and (ii) when testing the event of interest, the
central fact and peripheral details should be used in differ-
ent aIATs. The administration of these different aIATs should
be delayed in time at least one week from one administra-
tion to the other in order to avoid any reduced effect on the
D-IAT value.
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